Dr Alamdar Hussain Malik
The stalled privatization of Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) has produced economic and institutional aftershocks that extend far beyond the fate of a single loss-making enterprise. What was projected as a confidence-building reform instead exposed deep-rooted weaknesses in Pakistan’s governance framework, policy credibility, and institutional capacity, raising serious questions about the country’s broader reform trajectory.
From an economic standpoint, PIA’s financial position explains much of the investor hesitation. Over the past decade, the airline has accumulated losses exceeding Rs 700 billion, while its total liabilities have crossed Rs 800 billion, largely backed by sovereign guarantees. Annual losses have often ranged between Rs 60 and 75 billion, placing continuous pressure on the federal budget. In a fiscally constrained environment marked by high debt servicing and IMF commitments, such recurring losses have become increasingly unsustainable.
The fiscal burden is not abstract. Budgetary support to state-owned enterprises runs into hundreds of billions of rupees annually, with PIA among the largest recipients. At the same time, public development expenditure has fallen below three percent of GDP, while debt servicing consumes more than half of federal revenues. The opportunity cost of sustaining inefficiency is therefore borne directly by social sectors and long-term growth prospects.
However, focusing solely on losses presents an incomplete picture. PIA also possesses a substantial asset base. Government disclosures have previously placed the airline’s total assets in the range of Rs 170 to 180 billion, including aircraft, technical infrastructure, operational facilities, and receivables. Beyond operational assets, PIA owns valuable real estate, including prime properties in major Pakistani cities and high-profile overseas holdings such as the Roosevelt Hotel in New York and the Scribe Hotel in Paris. Independent assessments and official references have repeatedly indicated that these properties alone represent value running into tens of billions of rupees, particularly if redeveloped or commercially leveraged.
Equally important, though far less visible, are PIA’s traffic rights and landing permissions across nearly 78 domestic and international destinations. In global aviation markets, landing slots—especially at congested airports in Europe, the Middle East, and North America—are commercially valuable assets. These rights represent long-term market access that cannot be easily replicated by new entrants and often take decades to secure through bilateral agreements, safety compliance, and sustained operations. They form a strategic asset base that goes well beyond aircraft numbers or short-term profitability.
A domestic comparison illustrates this point clearly. Airblue, despite operating for more than twenty years and establishing itself as a major private airline, has not been able to secure direct landing rights to major European destinations. This is not a reflection of intent alone but highlights the structural difficulty of acquiring such permissions. The comparison underscores the rarity and value of PIA’s accumulated international access, which competitors have been unable to replicate despite years of operation.
The experience of Pakistan Steel Mills (PSM) offers a sobering institutional parallel. Once a strategic industrial asset, PSM ceased production in 2015 after prolonged mismanagement and political interference. By the time corrective action was attempted, accumulated losses and liabilities had exceeded Rs 400 billion, while the asset’s productive capacity had effectively collapsed. Delayed reform did not protect national interest; it eroded it. The PIA case risks following a similar trajectory if decisions remain indecisive or poorly structured.
This raises a legitimate question: if PIA holds such valuable tangible and intangible assets, why was privatization pursued instead of retaining it as a state-owned airline? The answer lies not in the absence of national value but in persistent governance failure. Over decades, public ownership failed to deliver operational autonomy, professional management, or financial discipline. Political appointments, frequent leadership changes, route interference, and procurement inefficiencies prevented PIA from functioning as a commercially independent entity. Retaining PIA under state ownership would have required deep, sustained governance reforms that successive governments were either unable or unwilling to implement, rendering continued public ownership fiscally and institutionally unrealistic.
Yet, acknowledging the necessity of privatization does not justify undervaluation. The bidding process appeared to concentrate heavily on liabilities and cash-flow weaknesses while failing to transparently account for strategic assets, including prime real estate holdings, offshore properties, and irreplaceable international landing rights. The contrast with private carriers lacking similar access reinforces the concern that these assets were not adequately reflected in bid valuations. Such an approach risks transferring national value below its true economic worth and undermines public confidence in the privatization framework.
In conclusion, the economic and institutional aftershocks of PIA privatization reflect both the cost of delayed reform and the danger of poorly structured execution. Pakistan’s challenge is not choosing between state ownership and privatization, but ensuring that reform is professional, transparent, and asset-aware. Comprehensive valuation models that recognize both tangible and intangible assets, combined with credible governance and labor transition frameworks, are essential if privatization is to serve the national interest rather than weaken it.
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